Tuesday 29 September 2009
0800
The Army does not do a very good job taking care of individually-mobilized reserve component soldiers. How do I know? Because I am one, and I am alone and adrift in a Kafkaesque nightmare.
The Army does a pretty good job of managing active-component soldiers through their assignments. It is also set up to do a pretty good job of mobilizing and demobilizing entire reserve component units. But when it comes to individual reservists who are mobilized and sent to fill augmentation positions in deployed units, the system leaves a lot to be desired.
When I was first mobilized I was pretty impressed with the thoroughness of the process. There were times when certain actions were duplicated and other times when people in various positions had incomplete or contradictory information, but on the whole it was pretty straightforward and got me overseas within a couple weeks after I reported for duty. It was after I had been deployed for awhile that I began to realize just how loose, disorganized, and dysfunctional the system for managing reserve personnel actions is for those of us serving on active duty.
The problem has many contributing causes, which probably makes it very hard to fix. First of all, there are different and incompatible systems for tracking personnel records in the Active Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. Access to these systems is restricted, and there is not always someone (in fact there is rarely ever *anyone*) in an active component unit who has access to the Reserve System to update it properly. It’s not that the personnel people can’t get access – but they rotate in and out of their positions so fast that they either don’t have time or don’t have the training or their login id doesn’t work or it’s not their responsibility or who knows what – there’s always some reason why your records don’t get updated properly.
Much more serious than the relatively simple problem of people having access to the automated record systems is the fact that nobody really knows what they are supposed to do to take care of you. Or perhaps it might be more correct to say that everybody knows exactly what to do, but the things they “know” are often inconsistent or even directly contradictory. There is such a maze of regulations, policies, messages, and SOPs that nobody can possibly know it all, and people come and go so fast that nobody ever knows everything about their own job, much less your personal history with the unit – the person who was here when you got here is gone before you leave, and the new person may or may not know what the last one knew. The answer you get depends upon who you ask and when you ask them, so assuming you can get someone to pay attention in the first place, it comes down to deciding who to believe.
The problem manifests itself through a whole panoply of personnel actions including evaluations, awards, promotions, pay and entitlements, leave, etc. . I have had a number of them affect me and soldiers who worked with me. For example, when trying to update the various awards and service ribbons I am supposed to have (which are important when preparing for a promotion board) I was told that all the Reserve personnel actions were the responsibility of my “home unit”, and so they refused to update my records. But since I was mobilized and cross-leveled into the deployed active component unit, that unit *was* my home – my former unit didn’t even have access to my records any more, much less know what awards and ribbons I was supposed to have.
The bottom line is that as an individually-mobilized reserve soldier, you are on your own when it comes to taking care of your records and your personnel actions. Nobody cares about it as much as you do, and if you want to ensure it’s done you have to really work at it. While this is always true to a certain extent, and it’s always a good idea to have a handle on your personnel file being up to date, in this particular situation it’s really up to you alone.
I really feel for the lower-ranking soldiers who are in this situation. At least I have the experience to know what questions to ask, and enough rank to get people’s attention from time to time. What happens to a private or specialist who gets tossed into the maelstrom? I wonder how many veterans are out there with incomplete or messed-up records or missing pay and entitlements, unable to get their problems fixed, or who just gave up in disgust.
Why am I writing about this now? Well, for the past three months I have known that I had a follow on assignment to Germany (since 24 June, to be exact). Since that date, I have been going through the process of trying to get orders, and now that my tour here is almost ended I am trying to work through the process of getting out of here and over there. Needless to say, it’s messed up. You really couldn’t make up some of the things that have happened (unless perhaps you were Franz Kafka or Joseph Heller).
In order to get mobilized and come over to the Middle East, I had to be released by my home unit (Eighth Army, CONUS). I filled out the necessary forms, got the commander’s permission, and was cross-leveled to USARCENT (Third Army), mobilized, and sent over here in 2006. When I extended my original mobilization in 2007, it was relatively easy – USARCENT just cut an extension order. When I decided to extend again in 2008, they had to go through a different process to put me on a status called COADOS – Contingency Operation, Active Duty Operational Support (this used to be called COTTAD – Contingency Operation Temporary Tour of Active Duty). That was also pretty straightforward. So I am currently on COADOS orders that end in a month.
After I decided to look for a tour in Germany and was accepted for an assignment on June 24, I began the process again. But this time it is different because I am changing to a new Army Service Component Command (ASCC). I am transferring from USARCENT to USAREUR (US Army Europe). For this reason they made me fill out a new DA Form 1058-R, and said I had to have my home unit commander’s signature again. OK, no problem.
Except that when I went to get that signature, I found out that my home unit was deactivated last fall and no longer exists. This kind of thing happens, of course, but wouldn’t you think they’d notify the soldiers in the unit that their unit no longer existed? Nobody told me. So I needed a signature from the commander of a unit that no longer existed. I needed to find out who “owned” me now. I found an officer who had been in the unit. He was about to retire, but he thought that all the people who had been in the Eighth Army (CONUS) and were mobilized and cross-leveled at the time it was deactivated had been sent to a certain other reserve unit in Indiana. He gave me some potential contacts.
I contacted the unit in Indiana, and the commander told me he’d take care of me, no problem. A couple of days later, however, he got back in contact with me. There was a problem after all – unlike others from Eighth Army who had been reassigned to them, I was not assigned to their unit - they could not find me on their books. He looked me up in a reserve personnel system, and told me I was assigned to “something called the Third Army Augmentation Company at FT McPherson, Georgia”. Surprise! That’s the unit I currently belong to in the active component. What’s going on here?
A little background: When you mobilize into USARCENT (Third Army) as an individual reserve component augmentee, you are first assigned to the Augmentation Company of the Special Troops Battalion (STB). They process your paperwork and help you through the mobilization process at FT Benning. (I described this process in detail back when I first started this blog in 2006). As far as I know, the entire raison’d’etre for this unit is to take care of the reserve component soldiers in USARCENT. I don’t know exactly what they do, but they sure as hell don’t take care of me. I’ve been mobilized in USARCENT for three years and with rare exceptions I never even heard from them until fairly recently, after I started agitating my way through this process of getting orders. But I’m getting ahead of myself. Back to the story…
I contacted the STB Augmentation Company and after some back-and-forth I found that I am in fact assigned to them. What I did not know before was that they are actually a reserve component unit themselves – they are part of an active component formation, but I guess since their mission is to take care of reserve soldiers they are a reserve unit. This made it clear why the Army just moved me over there (on paper) when my home unit was deactivated. It just would have been nice if someone would have told me about it. (Hypothetical question: what would have happened to all the personnel actions that my “home unit” was supposed to do if I hadn’t insisted they get taken care of here, and I went home and there was no unit?). Anyway, no harm no foul – I’d only lost a few days’ time figuring this out. So now I needed the signature of the Augmentation Company Commander on my 1058-R to request my orders, and I’d be in business.
GONG!
“Sorry, but we don’t sign 1058-R’s for soldiers requesting orders to other commands. You have to demobilize first and go back to your home unit.” “But you *are* my home unit.” “Sorry, that’s our policy”. So I went through some back and forth for awhile between USARCENT and USAREUR trying to figure out how to get the form signed. USAREUR couldn’t process my request for orders and send it to DA without a signature, and my unit wouldn’t sign it until I got out and went back to…them (?). It was nuts.
One suggested solution was to transfer out of the USARCENT Augmentation Company and go to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). Once in the IRR, I would be a “free agent” and could sign my own request for orders. So I initiated that process. The only problem was that the Augmentation Company said I could not do this while mobilized. I had to wait until I was demobilized to get to the IRR, which I was only doing so that I could get a signed DA Form 1058-R while mobilized since I couldn’t get them to sign it until I was demobilized…this was too much.
I filed an IG complaint. The IG (Inspector General) is an office in every major command whose job, among other things, is a sort of “complaint department” of last resort when something is messed up. So I called the IG’s office in Kuwait and told them my situation. They told me what I had to do (fill out a form, naturally), and send it in. This was on a Saturday morning.
On the following Monday I got a call – no problem, everything was signed, my request for transfer to the IRR was in process and my DA 1058-R was signed by the commander. Fill out this and that, include this to complete the packet, and my request for orders was in. It had taken six or seven weeks instead of the week or so that it should have, but at least it got done. Good thing I started early! Now to wait for orders.
There’s more.
You see, in the Army *everything* revolves around orders. Nothing is official without them, and nothing happens without them. So until my new orders come, I am on my old orders. Those orders say that my tour ends on 31 October. If my new orders don’t come by then, I am off active duty, not being paid, and certainly not authorized to be in the war zone. The normal process is that you start out-processing over here, get transported back to FT Benning a week to ten days before your orders end, and go through the demobilization process. This involves quite a bit of administrative work with finance, medical personnel, and supply. A big part of it is turning in all the equipment they issued me when I mobilized.
Here’s the thing that doesn’t make sense – my new orders are to start the day after these orders end – 1 Nov. So I will have no break in service, but remain on continuous active duty. The big question all along has been whether I have to go back to FT Benning to demobilize and then remobilize, or whether I can simply go straight from one assignment to the next. It seems to me that this would save the government a substantial amount of money in travel as well as keep me here working for a couple extra weeks before I get on the plane to Germany. But nobody really seems to know how it’s supposed to work – there are as many different answers as there are people to talk to.
I have been told everything from “You have to go back and turn everything in” to “You go straight to your next assignment and keep everything until you demobilize for the final time”, and many variations in between. It makes it hard to plan how to wrap up here and get ready to travel. Where do I send my stuff? When do I start out-processing?
If I am to send my equipment back to FT Benning, it’s really time to do it now. If I’m supposed to keep it, that would be easy, I can just ship it to Germany. Some folks have said I should turn it in here (all of it or only part of it, depending upon whom I talk to). Yesterday I spent the afternoon repacking all my issued equipment according to what kind of item it is, and whether I turn it in under various circumstances (ETS, PCS, etc). So now I have three different duffel bags, of which I will ship, keep, or turn in some combination depending upon what the final answer is.
Which gets me back to the title of this entry. I still don’t have orders, and I still don’t have answers. I am trying simultaneously to do my job here and prepare to leave, but the date, destination, and process are unknown, and there’s nobody who seems to know the answers. I am in the Army, but alone and adrift.
Mood: Stressed
Music: Bobby Horton, Homespun Songs of Vicksburg - Poor Wayfaring Soldier
Monday, September 28, 2009
Monday, September 7, 2009
Afghanistan Redux
Monday 7 September 2009
1730
The Ghilzaie Chief wrote answer “Our paths are narrow and steep,
“ The sun burns fierce in the valleys, and the snow-fed streams run deep;
…” So a stranger needs safe escort, and the oath of a valiant friend .”
The Amir’s Message, Sir Alfred Lyall, 1882.
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
- George Santayana
I have just finished reading a very interesting, instructive, and provocative book entitled “The Story of the Malakand Field Force – An Episode of Frontier War” by Sir Winston Churchill. It was his very first book, written in 1897 when he was a 22 year old subaltern (lieutenant). The subject of the book is the British expedition to put down the 1897 rebellion by the mountain tribes in the northwest frontier region of India. This area is now part of the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, directly bordering Afghanistan. It also happens to be one of the critical areas in which we are currently engaged against Al Queda and the Taliban. For that reason this book should be of particular interest to anyone interested in the current war in Afghanistan – yet I have not seen it on any COIN reading lists or mentioned in any anthologies. I found it quite by accident, while looking for something else.
I bought a printed copy of the book, but later discovered that it is out of copyright and is available for free: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/9404
The book is an absolute gem – a gold mine; I hardly know where to start. I suppose a bit of historical context is in order, following which I will summarize or excerpt the book’s high points, generally following the path of the author’s narrative. I’ll probably use quotations too extensively, but Churchill’s command of English was so complete and his writing so eloquent that it seems a shame, almost a crime, to try to shorten or paraphrase it.
The general context of the conflict was the resistance of the mountain tribes to the British Imperial Government’s so-called “Forward Policy”. For many years the boundary of the British Empire in India had been considered to be the edge of the mountains. The British were content to control the plains of India, and regarded the mountainous regions to the north and west as natural borders against Russian and Afghan incursion. A series of events caused them to re-evaluate this policy in 1879 and decide to push out into the mountains, and to control the entire drainage system of the Indus. Following that, they decided that they had to control the mountain passes as well, which led them to push towards Gilgit, Chitral, Jelalabad, and Kandahar. These incursions were naturally seen as a threat by the mountain tribes (primarily Pashtuns), who resisted fiercely, and finally commenced a general uprising in 1897. This book is the story of one particular expedition in that broader conflict, in which Churchill was a participant. His first-hand observations and reflections should be of interest to us today – “plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose”.
The first chapter is entitled “The Theatre of War”, and contains a description of the terrain as well as a number of cogent observations about the people of the region:
“Except at the times of sowing and of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife prevails throughout the land…Every man’s hand is against the other, and all against the stranger…To the ferocity of the Zulu are added the craft of the Redskin and the marksmanship of the Boer. “
“Every influence, every motive, that provokes the spirit of murder among men, impels these mountaineers to deeds of treachery and violence…In such a state of society, all property is held directly by main force. Every man is a soldier.”
“This state of continual tumult has produced a habit of mind which recks little of injuries, holds life cheap and embarks on war with careless levity, and the tribesmen of the Afghan border afford the spectacle of a people, who fight without passion, and kill one another without loss of temper.”
“Their system of ethics, which regards treachery and violence as virtues rather than vices, has produced a code of honour so strange and inconsistent, that it is incomprehensible to a logical mind. I have been told that if a white man could grasp it fully, and were to understand their mental impulses—if he knew, when it was their honour to stand by him, and when it was their honour to betray him; when they were bound to protect and when to kill him—he might, by judging his times and opportunities, pass safely from one end of the mountains to the other. But a civilised European is… little able to accomplish this…”
“All are held in the grip of miserable superstition… a state of mental development at which civilisation hardly knows whether to laugh or weep.”
“Their superstition exposes them to the rapacity and tyranny of a numerous priesthood—"Mullahs," "Sahibzadas," "Akhundzadas," "Fakirs,"—and a host of wandering Talib-ul-ilms, who…live free at the expense of the people.”
Churchill uses the second chapter to describe the initial dispositions of British outposts, supply lines, and military forces. Chapter 3, “The Outbreak” describes the beginning of the uprising:
“… a single class had viewed with quick intelligence and intense hostility the approach of the British power. The priesthood of the Afghan border instantly recognised the full meaning of the Chitral road. The cause of their antagonism is not hard to discern. Contact with civilisation assails the ignorance, and credulity, on which the wealth and influence of the Mullah depend.”
Throughout Churchill’s detailed descriptions of the various signs that trouble was brewing (but which were either unobserved or underappreciated by the government), the theme that emerges is that the average Westerner simply does not understand and cannot fully appreciate the way these people think. Their warlike nature, the extraordinary influence of their religious leaders, and the inscrutability of their shifting loyalties, alliances, and vendettas made what we would now call the “human terrain” every bit as forbidding and difficult to navigate as the steep mountains, deep rivers, and burning valleys of their country. The stage was set for a bloody conflict.
Chapters 4 through 16 are a detailed account of the military campaign, with many and specific episodes of long marches, sharp encounters, advance and retreat, triumph and disaster. It was as exciting and engaging to read as a novel, with the added attraction of being a true account of conflict in places where our enemies currently operate – the Swat Valley, Malakand, Mohmand, Baujaur… I read it with great interest as military history but also as an exercise in current professional development. While many of the specific tactical lessons are dated, the general principles are not. It seems to me that it would be of little value to describe the specific battles here, but I made a few notes in the margins when I thought that his observations might illuminate some enduring lesson:
On the death of a young officer: “Fortune (is) never so capricious as on the field of battle…”
On the ruins of an earlier, peaceful civilization that had thriven in the region in about the 5th century, at a time when Rome was being overrun by the Visigoths, Huns, and Vandals : “When we reflect on the revolutions which time effects, and observe how the home of learning and progress changes as the years pass by, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, perhaps a mournful one, that the sun of civilisation can never shine all over the world at once.”
Apologizing to the reader for including in his account the details of long dusty marches and camp routine, he says: “…he who would obtain a true idea of the soldier's life on service, must mentally share the fatigues of the march and the monotony of the camp. The fine deeds, the thrilling moments of war, are but the high lights in a picture, of which the background is routine, hard work, and discomfort.”
On the valley of the Jabdul: “This valley may, in natural and political features, be taken as typical of the Afghan valleys. Seven separate castles formed the strongholds of seven separate khans… It is ‘all against all,’ in these valleys…”
On the practicality of making alliances with local tribes: “As long as they fight, these Afghans do not mind much on which side they fight. There are worse men and worse allies helping us to-day.”
On the reliability of the locals: “Our guide meanwhile squatted on the ground and pronounced the names of all the villages, as each one was pointed at. To make sure there was no mistake, the series of questions was repeated. This time he gave to each an entirely different name with an appearance of great confidence and pride…”
To my surprise and delight, I ran across a famous Churchill quote, for which I now know the source and context: “Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.”
On mountain warfare: “It is impossible to realise without seeing, how very slowly troops move on hillsides.”
On the dangers inherent in withdrawals: “…while it is usually easy to advance against an Asiatic, all retirements are matters of danger.” This comment was one among many descriptions of the way in which the mountain tribesmen would give ground when pressed, but would pounce immediately upon any sign of British retreat or withdrawal, and harass a returning patrol right to the gates of the camp.
“Among Europeans power provokes antagonism, and weakness excites pity. All is different in the East. Beyond Suez the bent of men's minds is such, that safety lies only in success, and peace in prosperity. All desert the falling. All turn upon the fallen.”
This aspect of the character of the mountain tribes bears further emphasis – their system of ethics is completely different than ours; they respect only power and strength:
“The reader may have been struck, in the account of the fighting in the Mamund Valley, with the vigour with which the tribesmen follow up a retreating enemy and press an isolated party. In war this is sound, practical policy. But the hillmen adopt it rather from a natural propensity, than from military knowledge. Their tactics are the outcome of their natures. All their actions, moral, political, strategic, are guided by the same principle. The powerful tribes, who had watched the passage of the troops in sullen fear, only waited for a sign of weakness to rise behind them. As long as the brigades dominated the country, and appeared confident and successful, their communications would be respected, and the risings localised; but a check, a reverse, a retreat would raise tremendous combinations on every side. “
Churchill then goes on to explain how the way in which a local uprising is dealt with is relevant to the fate of the rest of the British Empire:
“If the reader will bear this in mind, it will enable him to appreciate the position with which this chapter deals, and may explain many other matters which are beyond the scope of these pages. For it might be well also to remember, that the great drama of frontier war is played before a vast, silent but attentive audience, who fill a theatre, that reaches from Peshawar to Colombo, and from Kurrachee to Rangoon. “
On the tribesmen's reaction to proffered aid: “Sir Bindon Blood offered them medical aid for their wounded, but this they declined. They could not understand the motive, and feared a stratagem.”
Commenting upon some confusion and conflict resulting from inconsistent policies: “The political officers must be under the control of the General directing the operations. There must be no ‘Imperium in imperio.’ In a Field Force one man only can command—and all in it must be under his authority. Differences, creating difficulties and leading to disasters, will arise whenever the political officers are empowered to make arrangements with the tribesmen, without consulting and sometimes without even informing the man on whose decisions the success of the war and the lives of the soldiers directly depend. “
Chapter 17 is entitled “Military Observations”. Here Churchill reviews and summarizes the more important observations and lessons of a strictly military nature:
“The first and most important consideration is transport. Nobody who has not seen for himself can realise what a great matter this is…In these valleys, where wheeled traffic is impossible, the difficulties and cost of moving supplies are enormous; and as none, or very few, are to be obtained within the country, the consideration is paramount.”
“…all the fighting occurred in capturing villages, which lay in rocky and broken ground in the hollows of the mountains, and were defended by a swarm of active riflemen…The tribesmen would dart from rock to rock, exposing themselves only for an instant, and before the attention of a section could be directed to them and the rifles aimed, the chance and the target would have vanished together… speaking generally, infantry should push on to the attack with the bayonet without wasting much time in firing, which can only result in their being delayed under the fire of a well-posted enemy. “
“As the enemy seize every point as soon as it is left, all retirements should be masked by leaving two or three men behind from each company. These keep up a brisk fire, and after the whole company have taken up a new position, or have nearly done so, they run back and join them. Besides this, the fire of one company in retiring should always be arranged to cover another, and at no moment in a withdrawal should the firing ever cease. The covering company should be actually in position before the rear company begins to move, and should open fire at once.”
“The necessity for having the officers in the same dress as the men, was apparent to all who watched the operations… at close quarters the keen-eyed tribesmen always made an especial mark of the officers, distinguishing them chiefly, I think, by the fact that they do not carry rifles.”
“The fatigues experienced by troops in mountain warfare are so great, that every effort has to be made to lighten the soldier's load. At the same time the more ammunition he carries on his person the better.”
“Great efforts should be made to give the soldier a piece of chocolate, a small sausage, or something portable and nutritious to carry with him to the field. In a war of long marches, of uncertain fortunes, of retirements often delayed and always pressed, there have been many occasions when regiments and companies have unexpectedly had to stop out all night without food. It is well to remember that the stomach governs the world.”
“…the enemy do not become formidable until a mistake has been made.”
“The terrible losses inflicted on the tribesmen in the Swat Valley show how easily disciplined troops can brush away the bravest savages in the open. But on the hillside all is changed, and the observer will be struck by the weakness rather than the strength of modern weapons. Daring riflemen, individually superior to the soldiers, and able to support the greatest fatigues, can always inflict loss, although they cannot bar their path.”
“The military problem…presented in the Afghan valleys; a roadless, broken and undeveloped country; an absence of any strategic points; a well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, who adopts guerilla tactics. The results…are, that the troops can march anywhere, and do anything, except catch the enemy; and that all their movements must be attended with loss.“
“This has been perhaps a cold-blooded chapter. We have considered men as targets; tribesmen, fighting for their homes and hills, have been regarded only as the objective of an attack; killed and wounded human beings, merely as the waste of war…but practical people in a business-like age will remember that they live in a world of men—not angels—and regulate their conduct accordingly. “
Given our own current situation in Afghanistan, it seems appropriate to close my entry with some of Churchill’s own closing words:
“We are at present in a transition stage, nor is the manner nor occasion of the end in sight. Still this is no time to despair. I have often noticed in these Afghan valleys, that they seem to be entirely surrounded by the hills, and to have no exit. But as the column has advanced, a gap gradually becomes visible and a pass appears. Sometimes it is steep and difficult, sometimes it is held by the enemy and must be forced, but I have never seen a valley that had not a way out. That way we shall ultimately find, if we march with the firm but prudent step of men who know the dangers; but, conscious of their skill and discipline, do not doubt their ability to deal with them as they shall arise.”
Mood: Calm & Confident
Music: Mozart – Clarinet Quintets
1730
The Ghilzaie Chief wrote answer “Our paths are narrow and steep,
“ The sun burns fierce in the valleys, and the snow-fed streams run deep;
…” So a stranger needs safe escort, and the oath of a valiant friend .”
The Amir’s Message, Sir Alfred Lyall, 1882.
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”
- George Santayana
I have just finished reading a very interesting, instructive, and provocative book entitled “The Story of the Malakand Field Force – An Episode of Frontier War” by Sir Winston Churchill. It was his very first book, written in 1897 when he was a 22 year old subaltern (lieutenant). The subject of the book is the British expedition to put down the 1897 rebellion by the mountain tribes in the northwest frontier region of India. This area is now part of the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan, directly bordering Afghanistan. It also happens to be one of the critical areas in which we are currently engaged against Al Queda and the Taliban. For that reason this book should be of particular interest to anyone interested in the current war in Afghanistan – yet I have not seen it on any COIN reading lists or mentioned in any anthologies. I found it quite by accident, while looking for something else.
I bought a printed copy of the book, but later discovered that it is out of copyright and is available for free: http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/9404
The book is an absolute gem – a gold mine; I hardly know where to start. I suppose a bit of historical context is in order, following which I will summarize or excerpt the book’s high points, generally following the path of the author’s narrative. I’ll probably use quotations too extensively, but Churchill’s command of English was so complete and his writing so eloquent that it seems a shame, almost a crime, to try to shorten or paraphrase it.
The general context of the conflict was the resistance of the mountain tribes to the British Imperial Government’s so-called “Forward Policy”. For many years the boundary of the British Empire in India had been considered to be the edge of the mountains. The British were content to control the plains of India, and regarded the mountainous regions to the north and west as natural borders against Russian and Afghan incursion. A series of events caused them to re-evaluate this policy in 1879 and decide to push out into the mountains, and to control the entire drainage system of the Indus. Following that, they decided that they had to control the mountain passes as well, which led them to push towards Gilgit, Chitral, Jelalabad, and Kandahar. These incursions were naturally seen as a threat by the mountain tribes (primarily Pashtuns), who resisted fiercely, and finally commenced a general uprising in 1897. This book is the story of one particular expedition in that broader conflict, in which Churchill was a participant. His first-hand observations and reflections should be of interest to us today – “plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose”.
The first chapter is entitled “The Theatre of War”, and contains a description of the terrain as well as a number of cogent observations about the people of the region:
“Except at the times of sowing and of harvest, a continual state of feud and strife prevails throughout the land…Every man’s hand is against the other, and all against the stranger…To the ferocity of the Zulu are added the craft of the Redskin and the marksmanship of the Boer. “
“Every influence, every motive, that provokes the spirit of murder among men, impels these mountaineers to deeds of treachery and violence…In such a state of society, all property is held directly by main force. Every man is a soldier.”
“This state of continual tumult has produced a habit of mind which recks little of injuries, holds life cheap and embarks on war with careless levity, and the tribesmen of the Afghan border afford the spectacle of a people, who fight without passion, and kill one another without loss of temper.”
“Their system of ethics, which regards treachery and violence as virtues rather than vices, has produced a code of honour so strange and inconsistent, that it is incomprehensible to a logical mind. I have been told that if a white man could grasp it fully, and were to understand their mental impulses—if he knew, when it was their honour to stand by him, and when it was their honour to betray him; when they were bound to protect and when to kill him—he might, by judging his times and opportunities, pass safely from one end of the mountains to the other. But a civilised European is… little able to accomplish this…”
“All are held in the grip of miserable superstition… a state of mental development at which civilisation hardly knows whether to laugh or weep.”
“Their superstition exposes them to the rapacity and tyranny of a numerous priesthood—"Mullahs," "Sahibzadas," "Akhundzadas," "Fakirs,"—and a host of wandering Talib-ul-ilms, who…live free at the expense of the people.”
Churchill uses the second chapter to describe the initial dispositions of British outposts, supply lines, and military forces. Chapter 3, “The Outbreak” describes the beginning of the uprising:
“… a single class had viewed with quick intelligence and intense hostility the approach of the British power. The priesthood of the Afghan border instantly recognised the full meaning of the Chitral road. The cause of their antagonism is not hard to discern. Contact with civilisation assails the ignorance, and credulity, on which the wealth and influence of the Mullah depend.”
Throughout Churchill’s detailed descriptions of the various signs that trouble was brewing (but which were either unobserved or underappreciated by the government), the theme that emerges is that the average Westerner simply does not understand and cannot fully appreciate the way these people think. Their warlike nature, the extraordinary influence of their religious leaders, and the inscrutability of their shifting loyalties, alliances, and vendettas made what we would now call the “human terrain” every bit as forbidding and difficult to navigate as the steep mountains, deep rivers, and burning valleys of their country. The stage was set for a bloody conflict.
Chapters 4 through 16 are a detailed account of the military campaign, with many and specific episodes of long marches, sharp encounters, advance and retreat, triumph and disaster. It was as exciting and engaging to read as a novel, with the added attraction of being a true account of conflict in places where our enemies currently operate – the Swat Valley, Malakand, Mohmand, Baujaur… I read it with great interest as military history but also as an exercise in current professional development. While many of the specific tactical lessons are dated, the general principles are not. It seems to me that it would be of little value to describe the specific battles here, but I made a few notes in the margins when I thought that his observations might illuminate some enduring lesson:
On the death of a young officer: “Fortune (is) never so capricious as on the field of battle…”
On the ruins of an earlier, peaceful civilization that had thriven in the region in about the 5th century, at a time when Rome was being overrun by the Visigoths, Huns, and Vandals : “When we reflect on the revolutions which time effects, and observe how the home of learning and progress changes as the years pass by, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion, perhaps a mournful one, that the sun of civilisation can never shine all over the world at once.”
Apologizing to the reader for including in his account the details of long dusty marches and camp routine, he says: “…he who would obtain a true idea of the soldier's life on service, must mentally share the fatigues of the march and the monotony of the camp. The fine deeds, the thrilling moments of war, are but the high lights in a picture, of which the background is routine, hard work, and discomfort.”
On the valley of the Jabdul: “This valley may, in natural and political features, be taken as typical of the Afghan valleys. Seven separate castles formed the strongholds of seven separate khans… It is ‘all against all,’ in these valleys…”
On the practicality of making alliances with local tribes: “As long as they fight, these Afghans do not mind much on which side they fight. There are worse men and worse allies helping us to-day.”
On the reliability of the locals: “Our guide meanwhile squatted on the ground and pronounced the names of all the villages, as each one was pointed at. To make sure there was no mistake, the series of questions was repeated. This time he gave to each an entirely different name with an appearance of great confidence and pride…”
To my surprise and delight, I ran across a famous Churchill quote, for which I now know the source and context: “Nothing in life is so exhilarating as to be shot at without result.”
On mountain warfare: “It is impossible to realise without seeing, how very slowly troops move on hillsides.”
On the dangers inherent in withdrawals: “…while it is usually easy to advance against an Asiatic, all retirements are matters of danger.” This comment was one among many descriptions of the way in which the mountain tribesmen would give ground when pressed, but would pounce immediately upon any sign of British retreat or withdrawal, and harass a returning patrol right to the gates of the camp.
“Among Europeans power provokes antagonism, and weakness excites pity. All is different in the East. Beyond Suez the bent of men's minds is such, that safety lies only in success, and peace in prosperity. All desert the falling. All turn upon the fallen.”
This aspect of the character of the mountain tribes bears further emphasis – their system of ethics is completely different than ours; they respect only power and strength:
“The reader may have been struck, in the account of the fighting in the Mamund Valley, with the vigour with which the tribesmen follow up a retreating enemy and press an isolated party. In war this is sound, practical policy. But the hillmen adopt it rather from a natural propensity, than from military knowledge. Their tactics are the outcome of their natures. All their actions, moral, political, strategic, are guided by the same principle. The powerful tribes, who had watched the passage of the troops in sullen fear, only waited for a sign of weakness to rise behind them. As long as the brigades dominated the country, and appeared confident and successful, their communications would be respected, and the risings localised; but a check, a reverse, a retreat would raise tremendous combinations on every side. “
Churchill then goes on to explain how the way in which a local uprising is dealt with is relevant to the fate of the rest of the British Empire:
“If the reader will bear this in mind, it will enable him to appreciate the position with which this chapter deals, and may explain many other matters which are beyond the scope of these pages. For it might be well also to remember, that the great drama of frontier war is played before a vast, silent but attentive audience, who fill a theatre, that reaches from Peshawar to Colombo, and from Kurrachee to Rangoon. “
On the tribesmen's reaction to proffered aid: “Sir Bindon Blood offered them medical aid for their wounded, but this they declined. They could not understand the motive, and feared a stratagem.”
Commenting upon some confusion and conflict resulting from inconsistent policies: “The political officers must be under the control of the General directing the operations. There must be no ‘Imperium in imperio.’ In a Field Force one man only can command—and all in it must be under his authority. Differences, creating difficulties and leading to disasters, will arise whenever the political officers are empowered to make arrangements with the tribesmen, without consulting and sometimes without even informing the man on whose decisions the success of the war and the lives of the soldiers directly depend. “
Chapter 17 is entitled “Military Observations”. Here Churchill reviews and summarizes the more important observations and lessons of a strictly military nature:
“The first and most important consideration is transport. Nobody who has not seen for himself can realise what a great matter this is…In these valleys, where wheeled traffic is impossible, the difficulties and cost of moving supplies are enormous; and as none, or very few, are to be obtained within the country, the consideration is paramount.”
“…all the fighting occurred in capturing villages, which lay in rocky and broken ground in the hollows of the mountains, and were defended by a swarm of active riflemen…The tribesmen would dart from rock to rock, exposing themselves only for an instant, and before the attention of a section could be directed to them and the rifles aimed, the chance and the target would have vanished together… speaking generally, infantry should push on to the attack with the bayonet without wasting much time in firing, which can only result in their being delayed under the fire of a well-posted enemy. “
“As the enemy seize every point as soon as it is left, all retirements should be masked by leaving two or three men behind from each company. These keep up a brisk fire, and after the whole company have taken up a new position, or have nearly done so, they run back and join them. Besides this, the fire of one company in retiring should always be arranged to cover another, and at no moment in a withdrawal should the firing ever cease. The covering company should be actually in position before the rear company begins to move, and should open fire at once.”
“The necessity for having the officers in the same dress as the men, was apparent to all who watched the operations… at close quarters the keen-eyed tribesmen always made an especial mark of the officers, distinguishing them chiefly, I think, by the fact that they do not carry rifles.”
“The fatigues experienced by troops in mountain warfare are so great, that every effort has to be made to lighten the soldier's load. At the same time the more ammunition he carries on his person the better.”
“Great efforts should be made to give the soldier a piece of chocolate, a small sausage, or something portable and nutritious to carry with him to the field. In a war of long marches, of uncertain fortunes, of retirements often delayed and always pressed, there have been many occasions when regiments and companies have unexpectedly had to stop out all night without food. It is well to remember that the stomach governs the world.”
“…the enemy do not become formidable until a mistake has been made.”
“The terrible losses inflicted on the tribesmen in the Swat Valley show how easily disciplined troops can brush away the bravest savages in the open. But on the hillside all is changed, and the observer will be struck by the weakness rather than the strength of modern weapons. Daring riflemen, individually superior to the soldiers, and able to support the greatest fatigues, can always inflict loss, although they cannot bar their path.”
“The military problem…presented in the Afghan valleys; a roadless, broken and undeveloped country; an absence of any strategic points; a well-armed enemy with great mobility and modern rifles, who adopts guerilla tactics. The results…are, that the troops can march anywhere, and do anything, except catch the enemy; and that all their movements must be attended with loss.“
“This has been perhaps a cold-blooded chapter. We have considered men as targets; tribesmen, fighting for their homes and hills, have been regarded only as the objective of an attack; killed and wounded human beings, merely as the waste of war…but practical people in a business-like age will remember that they live in a world of men—not angels—and regulate their conduct accordingly. “
Given our own current situation in Afghanistan, it seems appropriate to close my entry with some of Churchill’s own closing words:
“We are at present in a transition stage, nor is the manner nor occasion of the end in sight. Still this is no time to despair. I have often noticed in these Afghan valleys, that they seem to be entirely surrounded by the hills, and to have no exit. But as the column has advanced, a gap gradually becomes visible and a pass appears. Sometimes it is steep and difficult, sometimes it is held by the enemy and must be forced, but I have never seen a valley that had not a way out. That way we shall ultimately find, if we march with the firm but prudent step of men who know the dangers; but, conscious of their skill and discipline, do not doubt their ability to deal with them as they shall arise.”
Mood: Calm & Confident
Music: Mozart – Clarinet Quintets
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Don't Fight Your Pack
Tuesday 1 September 2009
1945
I haven’t felt much like writing lately. Why? A combination of things, I guess. I’ve been very busy, kind of tired, and spending a lot of time thinking ahead to the end of my tour, among other things. But mainly I think I’ve just been dragged down by some of the negative things I’ve been dealing with - primarily the bureaucracy and the incredible stupidity and inefficiency it engenders, with the result that it can be very hard to get anything done.
I’ve been working on a variety of things, and actually getting some things done, especially in the past couple of weeks (finally!) But I just haven’t felt much like writing.
I’ve read several books, about which I intend to write eventually, as soon as the mood strikes. But today a passage in one of the books I’m reading struck me, and I thought I’d share some of it.
The book is called “The Book of Camp-Lore and Wood Craft”. It’s by Dan Beard, one of the founders of the Boy Scouts of America, and it was written in 1920. It’s a treasure trove of information about old-fashioned camping skills. There are lengthy sessions on making fire with friction (i.e. “rubbing sticks together”) as well as percussion (flint and steel) and other means. There are also extensive notes on different arrangements of fires for different purposes, and lots of notes on other practical woodcraft skills . It is a very enjoyable read, although today’s lightweight equipment and “leave no trace” wilderness ethic make most of the skills and advice unnecessary and inappropriate except for emergency use. But it’s a lot of fun to read nonetheless, and of course “Be Prepared” includes knowing things like this just in case of emergency. Mostly I am enjoying reading it a few pages at a time as an escape from the desert. It reminds me of many nights spent out in the woods at home.
While it is not a Boy Scout manual per se, and is mostly just a how-to book of practical skills, I was struck by some passages I read today under the heading of “Don’t Fight Your Pack”. In this section, old Dan transitions from camping advice to moral instruction. I thought it was interesting and insightful, so here are some excerpts:
Don’t Fight Your Pack
“When we speak of ‘fighting the pack’, we mean fighting the load; that does not mean getting one’s load up against a tree and punching it with one’s fists or ‘kicking the stuffings out of it’, but it means complaining and fretting because the load is uncomfortable.
…the mind has as much to do with carrying the load as the muscles. If the mind gives up you will fall helpless under a small load; if the mind is strong you will stagger along under a very heavy one.
When I asked a friend, who bears the scars of the pack straps on his body, how he managed to endure the torture of such a load, he replied with a grin that as soon as he found that to ‘fight his pack’ meant to perish – meant death!-he made up his mind to forget the blamed thing and so when the pack wearied him and the straps rubbed the skin off his body, he forced himself to think of the good dinners he had had at the Camp-fire Club of America, yum! yum! Also, of all the jolly stories told by the toastmaster and of the fun he had had at some other entertainments. Often while thinking of these things he caught himself laughing out loud as he trudged along the lone trail, FORGETTING the hateful pack on his back. ‘In this way’, said he, with a winning smile upon his manly and weather-beaten face, ‘I learned how not to fight the pack but to FORGET IT! Then he braced himself up, looked at the snow-capped mountain range ahead, hummed a little cowboy song and trudged on over the frozen snow at a scout’s pace.
Now that you know what a pack is, and what ‘fighting the pack’ means, remember that if one’s studies at school are hard, that is one’s pack. If the work one is doing is very hard, difficult, or tiresome, that is one’s pack. If one’s parents are worried and forget themselves in their worry and speak sharply, that is one’s pack. Don’t fight your pack; remember that you are a woodcrafter; straighten your shoulders, put on your scout smile and hit the trail like a man!
If you find you are tempted to break the Scout Law, that you are at times tempted to forget the Scout Oath, that because your camp mates use language unfit for a woodcrafter or a scout, and you are tempted to do the same, if your playmates play craps and smoke cigarettes, and laugh at you because you refuse to do so, so that you are tempted to join them, these temptations form your pack; don’t give in and fall under your load and whimper like a ‘sissy’ or a ‘mollycoddle’, but straighten up, look the world straight in the eye, and hit the trail like a man!
Some of us are carrying portage packs which we can dump off our shoulders at the end of the ‘carry’, some of us are carrying hiking packs which we must carry through life and can never dump from our shoulders until we cross the Grand Portage from which no voyagers ever return. All our packs vary in weight, but none of them is easy to carry if we fret and fume and complain under the load."
Mood: Feeling Better :-)
Music: Bobby Horton, "The Army of the Free"
1945
I haven’t felt much like writing lately. Why? A combination of things, I guess. I’ve been very busy, kind of tired, and spending a lot of time thinking ahead to the end of my tour, among other things. But mainly I think I’ve just been dragged down by some of the negative things I’ve been dealing with - primarily the bureaucracy and the incredible stupidity and inefficiency it engenders, with the result that it can be very hard to get anything done.
I’ve been working on a variety of things, and actually getting some things done, especially in the past couple of weeks (finally!) But I just haven’t felt much like writing.
I’ve read several books, about which I intend to write eventually, as soon as the mood strikes. But today a passage in one of the books I’m reading struck me, and I thought I’d share some of it.
The book is called “The Book of Camp-Lore and Wood Craft”. It’s by Dan Beard, one of the founders of the Boy Scouts of America, and it was written in 1920. It’s a treasure trove of information about old-fashioned camping skills. There are lengthy sessions on making fire with friction (i.e. “rubbing sticks together”) as well as percussion (flint and steel) and other means. There are also extensive notes on different arrangements of fires for different purposes, and lots of notes on other practical woodcraft skills . It is a very enjoyable read, although today’s lightweight equipment and “leave no trace” wilderness ethic make most of the skills and advice unnecessary and inappropriate except for emergency use. But it’s a lot of fun to read nonetheless, and of course “Be Prepared” includes knowing things like this just in case of emergency. Mostly I am enjoying reading it a few pages at a time as an escape from the desert. It reminds me of many nights spent out in the woods at home.
While it is not a Boy Scout manual per se, and is mostly just a how-to book of practical skills, I was struck by some passages I read today under the heading of “Don’t Fight Your Pack”. In this section, old Dan transitions from camping advice to moral instruction. I thought it was interesting and insightful, so here are some excerpts:
Don’t Fight Your Pack
“When we speak of ‘fighting the pack’, we mean fighting the load; that does not mean getting one’s load up against a tree and punching it with one’s fists or ‘kicking the stuffings out of it’, but it means complaining and fretting because the load is uncomfortable.
…the mind has as much to do with carrying the load as the muscles. If the mind gives up you will fall helpless under a small load; if the mind is strong you will stagger along under a very heavy one.
When I asked a friend, who bears the scars of the pack straps on his body, how he managed to endure the torture of such a load, he replied with a grin that as soon as he found that to ‘fight his pack’ meant to perish – meant death!-he made up his mind to forget the blamed thing and so when the pack wearied him and the straps rubbed the skin off his body, he forced himself to think of the good dinners he had had at the Camp-fire Club of America, yum! yum! Also, of all the jolly stories told by the toastmaster and of the fun he had had at some other entertainments. Often while thinking of these things he caught himself laughing out loud as he trudged along the lone trail, FORGETTING the hateful pack on his back. ‘In this way’, said he, with a winning smile upon his manly and weather-beaten face, ‘I learned how not to fight the pack but to FORGET IT! Then he braced himself up, looked at the snow-capped mountain range ahead, hummed a little cowboy song and trudged on over the frozen snow at a scout’s pace.
Now that you know what a pack is, and what ‘fighting the pack’ means, remember that if one’s studies at school are hard, that is one’s pack. If the work one is doing is very hard, difficult, or tiresome, that is one’s pack. If one’s parents are worried and forget themselves in their worry and speak sharply, that is one’s pack. Don’t fight your pack; remember that you are a woodcrafter; straighten your shoulders, put on your scout smile and hit the trail like a man!
If you find you are tempted to break the Scout Law, that you are at times tempted to forget the Scout Oath, that because your camp mates use language unfit for a woodcrafter or a scout, and you are tempted to do the same, if your playmates play craps and smoke cigarettes, and laugh at you because you refuse to do so, so that you are tempted to join them, these temptations form your pack; don’t give in and fall under your load and whimper like a ‘sissy’ or a ‘mollycoddle’, but straighten up, look the world straight in the eye, and hit the trail like a man!
Some of us are carrying portage packs which we can dump off our shoulders at the end of the ‘carry’, some of us are carrying hiking packs which we must carry through life and can never dump from our shoulders until we cross the Grand Portage from which no voyagers ever return. All our packs vary in weight, but none of them is easy to carry if we fret and fume and complain under the load."
Mood: Feeling Better :-)
Music: Bobby Horton, "The Army of the Free"
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
